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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union uses large-scale fiscal transfers to national and regional levels to foster 
economic and social cohesion. Over the last two decades Structural Fund programmes 
supported by the Union have operated at the level of the member states and regions seeking to 
provide growth and jobs through enhanced competitiveness, with as ultimate objective to 
achieve real convergence in the Union. The resources are targeted on public and private 
investment in physical and human capital, and designed to increase economic and social 
cohesion among member states, enhancing a faster catch-up process of the less developed 
member states in terms of income per capita.  
 
Together with the Common Agricultural Policy, the Structural and Cohesion Funds make up 
the majority of EU spending. Around one third of the EU's budget is devoted to Regional 
policy. In 2007 a new Cohesion Policy programme started covering the period 2007-2013. It 
is expected that on average a sum of € 48 billion euro (in 2004 prices) per year will be 
allocated to Cohesion Policy for the period 2007-2013.  
 
Empirical evidence on the output effects from past spending on cohesion policy is mixed. 
Economic theory suggests clear benefits from investment in infrastructure and human capital 
and there is plenty of empirical evidence supporting this. But many of the assisted regions 
have remained relatively poor and growth regressions augmented with Structural Fund 
variables show no significant impact from these transfers (see Ederveen et al, (2002a,2002b).   
 
Some experts have expressed doubts about the effective and productive absorption of these 
large scale transfers and challenged the belief that these fiscal transfers are likely to achieve 
economic convergence. They question is to what extent these transfers will contribute to an 
increase in production capacities in the recipient countries. Following the classification in 
Hervé and Holzmann (1998) one can distinguish several reasons why the actual increase in 
(physical and human) capital could be considerably smaller than what would be expected 
under an optimal use of transfers: 
 
(1) Waste of transfers. Due to lack of adequate administrative environment, transfers may 
be used for investment projects with zero or negative economic return.  
(2) Administrative costs to ensure the best possible use of transfers. Extra resources 
needed for programming and monitoring that cannot be used for increasing the 
productive capacity of the economy. This should at least seek to avoid waste of 
transfers, and aim to avoid sub-optimal use.  
(3) Rent-seeking activities. Transfers provide an incentive to economic agents in public 
and private sector to invest resources in directly unproductive activities to catch a rent 
in the form of a share of the transfers. Competition for resources absorbs resources 
that can no longer be used productively.  
(4) Diversion of funds to consumption. Positive income shocks affect consumption-
investment decision of private and public sectors. Because of consumption-smoothing 
behaviour, the increase in future consumption possibilities will lead to higher 
consumption on impact, to the detriment of investment.
1  
                                                 
1 In addition to these factors, the authors list other "absorption problems" that could lead to a sub-optimal 
investive use of transfers; timing related problems (due to considerable time lags before returns to investment 
materialise, opportunity costs are high and private investment decisions may be delayed), information 
disadvantage of the disbursing authority  (leading to support of sub-optimal investment projects), public choice 
considerations (leading to intentional support of suboptimal projects). Finally, changes in relative prices could 
lead to Dutch disease type phenomena (rising factor demand non-tradable sector leading to decline in tradable 
sector), immiserising growth phenomena (industrial restructuring in favour of protected subsectors, with harmful   2
 
Hervé and Holzmann (1998) argue that for the EU cohesion policy programmes absorption 
problems are of empirical relevance and that their scope may be very high. They conclude 
that in some cases, transfers "may be unquestionably detrimental to economic growth and real 
convergence" (ibid, p.14) with as most likely cause rent seeking, protectionism and market 
rigidities. They also argue that absorption problems are likely to increase with the amount of 
transfers.  
 
Assessment of Structural Funds programmes has taken the form of impact evaluation at the 
micro level, examining impacts of individual projects or measures and conventional cost-
benefit analysis has calculated the economic or social rate of return of individual projects. 
However, it is difficult to take into consideration externalities and spillover effects of 
individual projects onto the rest of the economy. Macro economic evaluation studies on the 
other hand can assess the economy-wide feedbacks and interactions of the fiscal transfers at 
the aggregate level and the structural changes in productive potential of the economy as a 
whole. But when macro economic models have been used in past evaluations of Structural 
Funds, these have been macroeconometric models in which the demand side is essentially 
Keynesian in nature and no crowding-out appears (e.g. Bradley (2000), Bradley, Morgenroth 
and Untiedt (2003))  
 
This note uses the QUEST II model to evaluate the potential impact of the Cohesion Policy 
programmes under the convergence objective foreseen for the period 2007 to 2013. The 
QUEST II model is a global macroeconomic model with strong micro-foundations. The 
model contains a well specified supply side, allowing for the modelling of the productive 
impact of investment in infrastructure and human capital. Behavioural equations for 
households and firms are derived from the intertemporal optimisation problem for utility and 
profits. Hence, the model captures the response of private sector agents to the fiscal injection 
and allows for the possibility that public spending crowds-out private investment spending 
and leads to lower total investment spending due to consumption smoothing. On the basis of 
assumptions on the productive impact of the additional spending, the model provides an 
estimate of the potential benefits of the Cohesion Policy programmes. The following section 
briefly discusses the Cohension Policy programmes and the fiscal transfers involved. Section 
3 discusses how an impact analysis can be carried out with a macro-economic model like 
QUEST. The simulation results are described in section 4 and the impact on growth and other 
main macro-economic variables are discussed there for both the beneficiary countries and the 
donor countries. As model results depend crucially on assumptions on the productive impact 
of the additional spending, a sensitivity analysis is also included in section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
consequences for long run growth ) and worsening of negative effects of market failures ( polarisation effects of 
transfers due to increasing returns to scale and labour market distortions).   3
2. The European Union's  Cohesion Policy programme 2007-2013 
 
The European Union's policy for economic and social cohesion is the second largest item in 
the budget after the Common Agricultural Policy. For the period between 2000 and 2006, 
more than € 250 billion was spent in total on structural instruments for the 15 Member States, 
pre-accession aid and structural interventions for the new member states. This amounts to 
approximately 37 percent of the EU budget.  
 
For the period 2007 to 2013, a new generation of Structural Funds programmes are being 
prepared with a total budget of € 308 billion (in 2004 prices). The structural and cohesion 
fund will be concentrated on the following redefined objectives: 
 
•  a "convergence" objective (251.3 bn), to support growth and job creation in those 
member states and regions whose development is lagging behind (GDP per capita less 
than 75% of EU average)  
•  a "regional competitiveness and employment" objective (48.9 bn), to strengthen the 
competitiveness and attractiveness of regions as well as employment 
•  a "European cooperation" objective (7.8 bn), to enhance cross-border cooperation 
along land and sea borders, transnational cooperation on strategic priorities (research, 
information society and the environment) and interregional cooperation 
 
Although the exact allocation of funds has not been decided yet, estimates were provided by 
DG REGIO of cohesion policy interventions under the convergence objective per member 
state, in millions of euros (2004 prices), assuming 2006 exchange rates (Table 1). Note that 
this covers approximately 80 percent of the total cohesion policy spending.  
 
Table 1 Estimated Structural and Cohesion Funds Interventions  
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
 
Poland  7680 8025 8366 8405 8748 9074 9401  59699
Czech  3136 3223 3306 3391 3472 3548 3622  23697
Cyprus  158 129 100 70 41 41 41 581
Estonia  356 380 405 433 463 494 527  3058
Greece  2915 2804 2693 2582 2471 2408 2345  18217
Spain  5947 5330 4713 4196 3880 3784 3687  31536
Ireland  200 167 135 102 70 70 70 815
Italy  2774 2869 2753 2744 2690 2724 2714  19268
Latvia  480 513 549 584 619 655 691  4091
Lithuania 725 772 820 868 918 971 1023  6097
Hungary  2868 2991 3121 3227 3303 3414 3527  22451
Malta  108 109 109 109 109 109 108 761
Portugal  2807 2783 2759 2735 2711 2687 2663  19147
Slovenia  524 527 531 534 538 541 544  3739
Slovakia  1228 1303 1386 1480 1558 1632 1678  10264
Germany 2310 2264 2234 2196 2157 2118 2079  15358
Bulgaria  486 683 901 929 974 1017 1057  6047
Romania 1261 1774 2339 2753 2907 3063 3219  17317
          
Total  35963 36645 37219 37340 37628 38350 38998  262143
Mln. €, 2004 prices; Source: DG REGIO 
 
   4
Due to inevitable delays in member states submitting programmes and delays in decision 
taking, the actual payment profile is likely to differ substantially from the profile in Table 1. 
Past experience of previous programme periods have shown payments are typically spread 
over a longer period, and continue for up to two more years. Therefore in this exercise a 
payment profile is assumed based on the payment profile for six member states for the 
programming period 2000-6, and this payment profile covers the period 2007-2015. The 
Commission pays an inflation "supplement" (2% flat rate) and the adjusted interventions for 
the period 2007-2015 in "programming prices" are listed in Table A1 in the annex. To 
calculate model inputs, these transfers have been converted from euros into domestic 
currencies using average 2006 exchange rates. 
  
The fields of interventions are divided into three main categories and the following sub-
categories:  
 
1.  Infrastructure  
a.  transport,  
b.  environmental,  
c.  telecommunication,  
d.  urban rehabilitation,  
e.  social infrastructure and health,  
2.  Human resources  
a.  education,  
b.  labour market programmes,  
c.  social inclusion,  
d.  entrepreneurship  
e.  actions for women  
3.  Productive environment  
a.  business support, 
b.  tourism,  
c.  RTDI  
 
Infrastructure investment receives the largest share of funds, most of which is allocated to 
transport, but the fields of intervention cover a wide range of policy programmes. Details on 
the assumed fields of interventions, based on spending in the 2000-2006 programmes, are 




3. Macro-economic impact analysis 
 
This section describes how the macro-economic impact analysis of the proposed cohesion 
expenditure is carried out. The model used for this impact analysis is DG ECFIN's macro-
economic model QUEST II. The QUEST model is a global macroeconomic model, containing 
structural submodels for each of the member states of the European Union, the United States 
and Japan, and smaller “trade-feedback” models for remaining countries and regions of the 
world (Roeger and in 't Veld (1997,2004)). The model used for this exercise is an extended 
version which includes detailed submodels for the 10 new member states that joined in 2004.   5
Bulgaria and Romania are not modelled in detail, but only as separate trade-feedback models. 
For this reason no detailed country results are reported here for these two countries
2. 
  
The model can be described as a New Keynesian-Neoclassical Synthesis model, which 
combines the rigours of dynamic general equilibrium models with features of Keynesian style 
rigidities. The behavioural equations in the model are based on principles of dynamic 
optimisation of private households and firms, i.e. model equations are for the most part in 
forms that can be considered as structural equations derived from models of optimising 
behaviour. Economic agents are assumed to maximise utility and profit functions subject to 
intertemporal budget constraints. Consumption and investment decisions therefore 
incorporate forward looking behaviour. The supply side of the economy is modelled explicitly 
via a neo-classical production function. Firms operate in a monopolistically competitive 
environment and are able to charge a price mark-up over marginal costs. Labour markets are 
modelled through a bargaining framework capturing the interactions between firms and 
workers. Labour market rigidities and therefore involuntary unemployment persist even in the 
long run. The short run behaviour of the model is influenced by standard Keynesian features 
since the model allows for imperfectly flexible wages and prices, liquidity constrained 
consumption, adjustment costs for investment and labour hoarding. 
 
Relative prices on the macroeconomic level move in order to achieve macroeconomic 
equilibrium. Real interest rate and real exchange rate are determined endogenously in the 
model and enforce internal and external equilibrium. The real rate of interest is in the long run 
determined by savings and investment and the real exchange rate by demand and supply of 
domestic and foreign output. With real interest rates and exchange rates endogenous, possible 
crowding-out effects of fiscal transfers can be taken into account.  
 
Asset markets are assumed to be fully integrated across all the industrialised regions covered 
in the model, i.e. there is full capital mobility. Exchange rates are fully flexible and 
determined endogenously according to the (uncovered) interest arbitrage relation allowing for 
an exogenous risk premium reflecting the markets’ perception of risk differentials. Monetary 
policy is modelled through a Taylor-type rule, according to which monetary authorities set 
nominal short term interest rates to target the output gap and (expected) inflation gap. Of the 
EU member states not participating in EMU, it is assumed that Denmark follows the ECB and 
keeps the interest rate differential vis-à-vis the euro-area constant. The three Baltic states, 
Cyprus and Malta peg their currencies to the euro and for these countries a similar assumption 
is made. Other currencies float freely against the euro
3.  
 
For the government sector various expenditure and revenue categories are separately 
modelled. The government budget constraint is given by the following equation for the 
change in government debt B : 
                                                 
2 For the calculation of aggregates, the impact for Bulgaria and Romania are assumed to be equal to a weighted 
average of the effects in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, in line with the underlying assumptions on 
the fields of interventions made by DG Regio.  
3 Slovenia has adopted the euro in January 2007. Cyprus and Malta aim to introduce the euro in 2008. Other 
NMS may well adopt the euro during the programme period 2007-13, but considering the uncertainty 
surrounding their applications an appropriate modelling strategy would require a multitude of simulation variants 
with differing exchange rate regimes. This was not a feasible task and flexible exchange rates were assumed for 
those currencies not pegged to the euro. In anticipation of adopting the euro many NMS participate in the 
exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System (ERM-II). Under the requirements of ERM-II the 
exchange rate is allowed to appreciate within 15 percent of the ERM-II band. The exchange rate appreciations 
that are implied by the simulations here are sufficiently small that it can reasonably be assumed that no conflict 
with these requirements arises.   6
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On the expenditure side a distinction is made between  
 
1.  government interest payments on public debt  i*B 
2.  government consumption, subdivided into  
a.  government purchases of goods and services C
G 
b.  government wage bill (public sector employment L
G times public sector 
wages w
G) 
3.  government investment I
G 
4.  unemployment benefits paid to the unemployed  ben*U 
5.  other government transfers to households  TR  
6.  subsidies to firms  ISUB 
 
The government receives revenue from the following sources: 
 
1.  wage taxes TW,  
2.  corporate profit taxes TC  
3.  indirect taxes TIND,  
4.  a residual (lump-sum) tax TRES 
5.  and fiscal transfers received from the EU  COH  (which is negative for net 
contributors) . 
 
The QUEST II model is partly estimated, but for those equations that could not directly be 
estimated, use has been made of available estimates in the empirical literature
4. Country 
differences in the model are data-driven and mainly reflect differences in trade linkages and 
import shares as well as differences in income shares in national accounts. Structural 'deep' 
parameters are assumed to be identical across countries but institutional differences (e.g. in 
labour markets) play a role
5. The main difference between old and new member states lies in 
the degree of openness (Table 2). The NMS countries are generally much more exposed to 
trade than the old member states. This is reflected in a much higher share of imports of goods 
and services in total GDP. Their intra-EU trade share (data on goods only) is also much 
higher. Table 2 also shows current GDP growth rates and current account imbalances for the 
NMS. Many are showing clear signs of overheating. In particular Latvia and Bulgaria face 
problems with current account deficits close to 15 percent of GDP or higher. Fiscal transfers 
under the EU Cohesion policy programmes will amount to additional injections of between 2 
and 3 percent of GDP in each of these economies. The question is how such large transfers 
can be efficiently absorbed. 
 
 
                                                 
4 For the calibration use is also made of estimates of our DSGE model (Ratto et al. (2006)). 
5 One difference in the model for the NMS is a higher assumed share of liquidity-constrained consumption (0.4 
rather than 0.3) and a larger share of "liquidity-constrained" firms that finance their investment out of current 
profits (0.3 compared to 0.2).   7
Table 2  Openness, trade, public investment shares and growth in the EU (2006) 
 
 Imports  goods 
and services  
(% of GDP) 
Intra-EU  
imports goods  
(% of GDP) 
Current account 
balance 
(% of GDP) 
Government 
investment  




BE 87.5  62.3  2.3 1.7  3.1 
DE 38.1  19.3  4.7 1.4  2.7 
EL 28.1  13.2  -11.4  3.6  4.3 
ES 31.3  15.3  -8.5  3.9  3.9 
FR 29.1  16.8  -2.0  3.4  2.0 
IE 67.8  22.5  -2.6  3.9  6.0 
IT 28.2  12.8  -2.0  2.3  1.9 
NL 68.3  29.7  9.9 3.3  2.9 
AT 47.6  33.4  3.7 1.1  3.1 
PT 38.8  25.7  -9.8  2.3  1.3 
FI 37.0  20.7  5.9  2.6  5.5 
DK 45.3  21.7 2.4 1.8  3.2 
SE 43.0  22.4  7.0  3.2  4.4 
UK 31.6  12.8  -3.4 1.9  2.8 
          
CZ 71.5  51.6  -4.1  5.1  6.1 
EE 92.6  57.2  -13.9  3.6  11.4 
CY 54.3  27.9  -5.9  3.3  3.8 
LV 65.2  40.0  -21.1  3.4  11.9 
LT 70.3  35.2  -10.7  4.2  7.5 
HU 73.7  43.6  -5.9 4.5  3.9 
MT 81.0  48.4  -6.3 4.6  2.9 
PL 39.5  27.0  -2.2  4.2  5.8 
SI 67.5  47.1  -2.0  3.7  5.2 
SK 86.8  60.5  -7.7  2.2  8.3 
BG 81.6 -- -15.8  3.7  6.1 
RO 44.1 -- -10.3  2.9  7.7 
 
Source: European Commission Spring 2007 forecast.  
 
 
3.2  Fiscal transfers 
 
The fiscal transfers related to the Cohesion Policy programmes are modelled as lump sum 
transfers between governments COH
6. Concerning the financing of these transfers, a technical 
assumption is made that contributions to Cohesion Policy programmes are levied on the EU 
15 member states proportionally to GDP
7. For those EU15 countries that receive funds for 
their poorer regions (Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland) the net 
contributions are adjusted for these receipts.  The assumptions on financing imply that Spain, 
Portugal and Greece receive more from the Structural Funds than that they would contribute. 
It is assumed that the additional contributions to the EU budget are financed in the donor 
countries through an increase in wage taxes TW 
8. 
  
Cohesion policy programmes are subject to the condition of additionality and co-financing.  
Additionality requires that Structural Funds are additional to domestically-financed 
                                                 
6 These foreign transfers also enter the current account identity. 
7 This technical assumption only serves to guarantee the model is closed as far as fiscal transfers between 
countries are concerned. A more detailed modelling of contributions to the EU budget falls beyond the scope of 
this note.  
8 Alternative scenarios not shown here assume financing  through other tax increases or reductions in 
government consumption or investment.   8
expenditure and are not used to substitute for it. The co-financing principle means the EU 
provides only matching funds to individual projects that are part of the operational 
programmes and that the EU funds are matched to a certain extent by domestic expenditure.  
The problem with defining a proper benchmark means that in practice this principle of 
additionality is hard to verify 
9 and is thus not always binding. Member States are not required 
to create new budgetary expenditure to co-finance cohesion policy support. Existing national 
resources that were used to finance similar areas of interventions (and are thus concerned by 
the additionality requirement) can be 'earmarked' to co-finance Structural Fund transfers. 
Total spending increases only by the amount of Structural Fund transfers. Assume a co-
financing rate of c, i.e. the EU transfer COH has to be matched by domestically-financed 
expenditure c.COH . The additionality and co-financing principles can be expressed as the 
following condition for total government spending in a beneficiary country: 
 
] . , max[ 0 COH c EXP COH TOTEXP t t + =        ( 2 a )  
 
where TOTEXP is total expenditure, COH is the fiscal transfer received from the EU cohesion 
funds,  EXP0 domestically–financed expenditure in the counterfactual situation (without 
Structural and Cohesion Funds), and c is the co-financing rate. Examining the additionality 
tables of Member States, it is apparent that national public expenditure concerned by 
additionality usually exceeds the co-financing needs by far. In this case EXP0 > c.COH, and 
total expenditure is given by 
10 
 
0 EXP COH TOTEXP t t + =          ( 2 b )  
 
As spending on infrastructure and education is already high in the NMS countries, this 
exercise takes domestically–financed expenditure EXP0 in the counterfactual situation 
(without structural and cohesion funds) as the benchmark and only examines the impact of the 
fiscal transfer COH  received from the EU cohesion funds (equation 2b). Although this 
considerably reduces the magnitude of the spending shocks in the model, it should be noted it 
also reduces significantly the potential for crowding-out effects. If the co-financing need 
exceeded EXP0, the need for budgetary restraint would be exacerbated, and the real exchange 
rate adversely affected. Model simulations with such co-financing assumptions show stronger 
crowding out effects (Roeger (1996), Gaspar and Pereira (1992)). 
 
The transfers received by the beneficiary countries are allocated to investment programmes 
that can roughly be divided into three broad categories (as listed in Table A2):  
 
1.  Investment expenditure on physical infrastructure 
2.  Investment expenditure on human resources 
3.  Productive environment : expenditure on investment aid to the private sector 
 
The modelling of each of these types of investment are discussed below. 
 
                                                 
9 Ederveen et al. (2002b) estimate EU Structural Funds have still crowded out national support to lagging 
regions by 17 percent on average, in spite of the additionality and cofunding requirement. 
10 Herve and Holzmann (1998) criticise earlier model based studies of structural funds for grossly exaggerating 
the total impact because they assumed that the full Structural Fund spending is additional to investment in the 
counterfactual situation    t t t COH c EXP COH TOTEXP . 0 + + =  while the correct formulation of the 
additionality principle is given by (2b).  
   9
3.3  Investment expenditure on physical infrastructure 
 
In QUEST, investment expenditure on physical infrastructure is modelled explicitly as an 
increase in government investment I
G. There is a direct demand effect from spending on 
government investment as I
G  enters directly into the GDP identity. But public capital also 
contributes directly to productivity, as public infrastructure is central to the functioning of the 
economy and has positive externalities.  
 
Assume a standard production function for private sector output Y  
 
) , ( L K AF Y
P =            ( 3 )  
 
where A is an index representing total factor productivity, K
P is the stock of private capital, L 
is the labour force. Now the productivity enhancing effect of public capital can be captured by 
expanding the aggregate production function to include the public capital stock  
 
) , , (
G P K L K F A Y
∗ =  
 
where A* is total factor productivity now excluding any effects from public capital, and K
G 
the stock of public capital. The assumed technology is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to 
scale to private capital and labour. This formulation assumes public investment increases total 
factor productivity by lowering production costs and shifts the production function upwards. 
The marginal product of the public capital stock is assumed to be equal to that of private 
capital in the model.  
 








t I K dep K + − = −1 ) 1 (           ( 4 )  
 
where  dep
G the depreciation rate of public capital. As the public capital stock mainly 
represents physical infrastructure, the depreciation rate is set at the low value of 4 percent.  
 
There is a large literature on infrastructure investment and economic growth. Interest in this 
topic increased largely as a result of a series of papers by Aschauer (1989, 1990) which 
ascribed the slowdown in US productivity growth in the 1970s to lower infrastructure 
investment. Aschauer found a significant and strong positive impact of public investment on 
output for the US. He estimated that a 1 percent increase in the public capital stock would 
raise output by 0.39 percent, implying estimates of the marginal product of public capital of 
100 percent per annum or more. 
 
Many economists have questioned these estimates as implausibly high. There are various 
difficulties with the determination of the productivity impact of public investment with 
macroeconomic time series
11. The main logical problem with the production function 
approach is related to the difference between marginal versus average. All that production 
studies of this kind can show is that some public investment has been productive in the past. 
The question is whether new investment in the future will also be productive. Building a 
network of motorways may have been highly beneficial, but expanding this network further 
may yield substantially lower benefits. Fernald (1999) reports that once the highway network 
                                                 
11 For an overview see the surveys by Gramlich (1994), Sturm (1998), European Commission (2003)  and Romp 
and de Haan (2005)    10
in the US was almost completed after 1973 the hypothesis that the marginal productivity of 
new roads is zero cannot be rejected. In this context it is often argued that the most productive 
investment projects have already been undertaken and that there is a risk that large transfers 
from abroad are used for less productive projects. This applies in particular for more 
developed economies, and it is not a priori clear how relevant this is for the NMS.  
 
There are also various econometric problems with this type of productivity studies. First there 
is the issue of common trends. The public capital stock and productivity may just display 
common trends for very different reasons and these regressions then overestimate the impact. 
First differencing times series overcomes this problem and leads to much lower estimates, not 
significant and often not even positive. Testing for cointegration and adjusting them before 
estimation also leads to the same conclusion of no significant productivity impact of 
infrastructure investment. A related problem is missing variables. It has been suggested that 
the other variables may explain the high original estimated impact on US productivity growth. 
The obvious candidate is energy prices, which increased significantly in 1973 and could have 
made some private capital obsolete. To overcome this problem, one should control for energy 
inputs in productivity regressions. But the major problem in estimating a production function 
is simultaneity bias and the potential for reverse causation. The question is whether causality 
runs from infrastructure to economic growth or from growth to infrastructure investment. 
Production function studies using macro economic time series may also pick up the short-run 
demand effect of infrastructure investment and so overestimate the productivity effect. 
However, some of the studies that have tried to correct for these problems have found similar 
high rates of return. Using pooled time series, cross-section data across states, has generally 
yielded more sensible estimates with an implied rate of return on public investment equal to 
the rate of return on private capital or lower. For instance Bougheas et al. (2000) find high 
output elasticities of transport infrastructure ranging from 0.001 for Finland to 0.183 for 
Austria, and even more variation, and even negative estimates, in poorer countries
12. 
Estimated effects of other infrastructure investment like telecommunications are much 
smaller, sometimes in the order of one-tenth of those of transport infrastructure. Most 
empirical cross country growth studies have not made a distinction between public and 
private investment, but those that have included public capital in cross-country growth 
regressions have generally found significant positive effects from public investment, although 
with a coefficient smaller than that of private investment. 
 
Summarising these studies it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the extremely wide range of 
estimates found in the literature makes these production function studies almost useless from 
a policy perspective (Romp and de Haan, p.43). Implementing the upper range of estimates of 
output elasticities in micro-founded macro-economic models would imply such high rates of 
return on public capital that the implied level for the optimal stock of public capital would be 
implausibly high. It is not clear how one can justify assuming a higher rate of return on public 
capital than that of private capital in a structural macro model
13. In the QUEST model 
                                                 
12 Although the marginal productivity of infrastructure investment may be higher in developing countries, output 
elasticities need not be higher than those in developed ones because the stock of infrastructure capital is lower in 
those countries. The explanation for the finding of negative marginal productivities in some developing countries 
could be related to bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption (see Bougheas et al, 2000) 
13 Gramlich  (1994) summarises the "logical" problem of the high implied econometric rates of return: "It is hard 
to see how the rate of return on public capital measured from output changes could ever lie above that of private 
capital. The private capital rate shows how private investors are making decisions at the margin, comparing 
marginal output benefits of their capital with the opportunity cost of their own funds. For public capital, these 
same investors would compare marginal output benefits with the opportunity cost of somebody else's funds. If 
public investment really were as profitable as claimed, would not private investors be clamouring to have the 
public sector impose taxes or float bonds to build roads, highways, and sewers to generate these high net   11
therefore an identical marginal product of capital is assumed, i.e. the marginal product of 
public capital is set equal to that of private capital. This applies to all countries in the model, 
including the NMS. Note that this does not exclude the possibility that the marginal product 
of capital (private and public) is higher in NMS.  
 
As is clear from Table A2 in the annex, transport infrastructure forms only one part of total 
infrastructure investment and the planned fields of intervention cover a much wider range of 
areas. Not all the planned expenditure under the heading "infrastructure" is likely to be as 
productive as that on transport infrastructure. Of the Cohesion Funds spending it is assumed 
half of the planned interventions are for transport infrastructure and the other half to 
environmental infrastructure (water supply, waste water, waste). Although more than half of 
the planned Structural Funds spending on infrastructure applies to transport infrastructure, 
still a large share of spending is reserved for environmental infrastructure, telecommunication 
infrastructure, urban rehabilitation, social infrastructure and health. It is much more difficult 
to assess the productive impact of spending in some of these other areas. While these 
programmes may be justified from a social policy perspective, it is questionable whether the 
productivity of some of this spending is as high as that of transport infrastructure spending, or 
indeed of private investment, in economic terms. For instance, Bougheas et al. (2000) report 
much lower estimated effects of telecommunication infrastructure, sometimes in the order of 
one-tenth of those of transport infrastructure.  
 
To illustrate the uncertainty surrounding the productive impact of total infrastructure 
investment, two alternative scenarios are shown in this note. In the first scenario, all 
infrastructure investment is assumed to be as productive as transport infrastructure. While this 
may seem too optimistic, it is useful for providing an "upper bound" to the potential effects of 
infrastructure investment. In the second "lower" variant, other infrastructure investment is 
assumed to be only half as productive as transport infrastructure investment. While one could 
argue this assumption is arbitrary, it seems likely that the productivity of spending on social 
infrastructure and urban rehabilitation is lower than that of transport infrastructure, and the 
sole purpose of this alternative scenario is to show the sensitivity of the results to assumptions 
concerning the productivity impact.  
 
 
3.4  Investment expenditure on human resources 
 
Spending on human capital under the cohesion policy programmes covers a wide a range of 
fields of interventions (education, labour market programmes, social inclusion, 
entrepreneurship and actions for women). Investment in education is generally recognised as 
one of the most important drivers of growth.  But the impact of increased spending on 
education is only likely to be reflected in the skill structure of the labour force years later, if 
not decades, as it takes many years before the labour force has absorbed the higher educated 
cohorts. Hence, the skill structure of the labour force lags substantially behind educational 
                                                                                                                                                          
benefits? The impact on business profits would be higher than for private capital and the cost to business less. 
While it is hard to measure the clamor of private business investors, and even harder to determine whether 
inducing clamor is an efficient modus operandi for business investors, very little such pressure seems to have 
been observed, even when the implied econometric rates of return were allegedly very high"  (ibid., p. 1187)  .  
A simple simulation experiment with the QUEST model illustrates this argument. If  the marginal product of 
public capital is assumed to be higher than that of private capital, it would indeed be optimal to raise corporate 
taxes to realise a substitution of private capital for public capital. If the marginal product of public capital is set 
to twice that of private capital, an increase in the public investment share in GDP by 3 percentage points (from 3 
to 6 percent of GDP) financed by an increase in corporate profit taxes, would raise the level of output by more 
than 2.5 percent over a period of 10 years.   12
spending. The long lags related to this 'cohort effect', combined with the fact that a large part 
of human resources spending is not on education but on other (social policy) spending 
categories, makes it extremely difficult to assess the productive impact of this spending in a 
modelling framework. 
 
In the QUEST model the demand impact of investment on human resources is captured by 
government consumption and investment. It is assumed spending is equally divided over  
 
1.  public sector employment   L
G    (e.g. employing more teachers),  
2.  government purchases   C
G   (e.g. spending on teaching material)  
3.  government investment    I
G   (e.g. building of schools).  
 
For the first two components an assumption is made on how this spending impacts on 
productivity, while for the third component, the productive impact of government investment 
is described above. A large range of empirical studies show the social rate of return of one 
additional year of schooling to lie between 6 and 12 percent. To capture this impact on 
productivity the model has been adapted in the following way. The productive impact of the 
additional spending on government consumption (public employment and government 
purchases) is assumed to raise total factor productivity A* (eq. 3b). The magnitude of this 
productivity effect of education spending is calibrated on the results reported in the European 
Commission (2003) study in which the productivity effect of one year additional schooling is 
estimated to be 0.5 percent after 5 years and 1.4 percent after 10 years (the long run effect was 
estimated at 12.8 percent). The gradual build-up reflects the time lags between education and 
the skill structure of the labour force. On the basis of available data on current spending on 
education (around 5 percent of GDP) and the average years of schooling an estimate can be 
made of the additional years of schooling that can be financed by the fiscal transfers.  
 
These estimates of the productivity effect of education are high. This is particularly true for 
the long run effect, but even the effect after 10 years (which is more relevant for the current 
analysis) is on the high side. They lie at the upper bound of the range reported in the survey 
by Sianesi and van Reenen (2003). There a one-year increase in average education is found to 
raise the level of output per capita by  between 3 and 6 percent according to augmented neo-
classical specifications, while it would lead to an over 1 percentage point faster growth 
according to estimates from the new-growth theories
14. De la Fuenta and Domenech (2006) 
construct estimates of educational attainment for a sample of countries and find a clear 
positive correlation between data quality and the size and significance of human capital 
coefficients in growth regressions. They construct a set of meta-estimates of the coefficient of 
years of schooling in an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function. Their results suggest 
that the value of this parameter is higher than previously studies have found, and is likely to 
be above 0.6. 
 
It should be noted that the studies on which this productivity assumption is based relate to 
school education (primary, secondary and tertiary) while Structural Fund spending is more 
directed towards post-school training, special-needs education and social policy measures like 
social inclusion and actions for women, which is likely to have a lower productivity impact. 
Hence, it gives an upper bound of the likely effects. To reflect the uncertainty surrounding the 
productivity impact of spending on these other policies, two variants are shown in this note. 
In the first most optimistic scenario it is assumed all spending under the heading "human 
resources" has the same productive impact as educational spending. In the second scenario, 
                                                 
14 The impact of increases at different levels of education appear to depend on the level of a country’s 
development, with tertiary/higher education being the most important for growth.    13
the productivity impact of spending in these other fields is assumed to be only half that of 
educational spending. This alternative scenario shows the sensitivity of the results to the 
assumed productivity impact. 
 
  
3.5  Productive environment : direct aid to firms for private investment 
 
The third category of cohesion policy expenditure concerns direct aid to the private sector 
(excluding agriculture) to support private investment. The investment decision of firms in the 
model is derived from profit maximising principles  
 
  ) ( * ) , , ( * ) 1 ( 1 − + − = t t t
t
t PROF F lcf PIP Q F lcf
K
I
ϕ       (5) 
 
where  Q is a measure of (discounted) expected future profitability, PIP the relative 
investment price deflator (relative to the GDP deflator), φ the adjustment cost parameter, 
PROF is current profits (gross operating surplus) and lcf is the share of firms that are liquidity 
constrained and finance investment out of current profits. An increase in investment leads to a 
higher stock of private capital and so increases the output potential of the economy and has a 
long run supply effect. 
  
The direct aid from the government to firms ISUB
G adds to the resources of firms from which 
they can finance investment (demand effect). The direct subsidy to private investment 
spending does not necessarily lead to a proportional increase in ex-post investment as it can 
be partially crowded-out by a reduction in private savings and higher interest rates (higher 
consumption). Increases in government infrastructure spending could also have an adverse 
impact on private investment due to higher interest rates and higher wage growth, which 
negatively affects future profits. Hence, private sector investment can be crowded out 
significantly by the increase in overall government spending.  
 
A small share of total aid to the productive sector is assigned to R&D expenditure, the 
productive impact of which is potentially much higher than that of other investment. In the 
model the productivity effect of R&D spending is captured by a TFP shock that is calibrated 
on the results of a new QUEST model with endogenous R&D. Simulations with this semi-
endogenous growth model suggest a permanent increase in R&D investment of 1 percent of 
GDP raises TFP by 3 percent after 10 years. A proportional shock to total factor productivity 
(A* in eq. 3b) is calibrated for the share of structural funds allocated to R&D expenditure. In a 
sensitivity analysis the assumed productivity effect of the R&D component of spending on the 
productive environment  is set to only half that, to illustrate the uncertainty surrounding the 
externalities of R&D investment. 
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4. Simulations 
 
The previous sections have described how Cohesion Policy interventions are incorporated in 
the QUEST model. This section proceeds with the policy simulations and reports the 
simulations results of the cohesion policy programmes under the convergence objective for 
the 2007-2013 programming period.  
 
The scenario described in this section assumes large supply side effects from infrastructure 
investment, R&D spending and education. In particular for the latter two categories however, 
time lags are considerable and cohort effects lead to only a very gradual build-up of these 
positive productivity effects. While their long run effects will be higher than those of 
infrastructure investment, the transfers are assumed to be phased out after the programming 
period 2007-2013 and hence the shocks cannot be assumed to be permanent. Nevertheless 7 
or 9 years of additional investment results in significant supply side improvements.  
 
Table 4 shows the impact of the cohesion policy interventions on the net beneficiaries 
(EL,ES,PT,CZ,EE,CY,LV,LT,HU,MT,PL,SI,SK,RO,BG), the new member states (NMS 
aggregate), the net donor countries (BE,DE,FR,IE,IT,NL,AT,FI,DK,SW,UK) and the EU15 
(results for individual countries are reported in the annex). The fiscal transfer received under 
the convergence objective of the Cohesion Policy programmes amounts to approximately 2 
percent of GDP for the NMS on average. The additional spending has an immediate demand 
impact in the beneficiary countries and builds up over the following years. Consumption is 
directly boosted by the additional spending and higher permanent income (expected future 
income is up) also leads to higher spending. Although the business sector receives direct 
support from the government, encouraging investment, this subsidy is not enough to offset the 
negative impact of higher government spending on infrastructure and human resources and 
there is net crowding-out of private investment in the first years of the simulation. Only in 
later years does investment grow to levels above baseline. The additional spending leads to 
higher inflation, puts upward pressure on interest rates and leads to a real appreciation in the 
first years of the simulation. For small open economies import leakage is an important factor 
that reduces the impact of demand impulses. Imports rise due to higher demand and the trade 
balance of these countries deteriorates further. Many NMS already have large trade deficits 
but the demand impulse from these fiscal transfers risks widening these imbalances even 
further. 
  
The output gains become gradually larger as the supply side effects become stronger, and 
output rises to more than 5 percent above baseline on average for the NMS. A large part of 
these gains are permanent as the productive potential of the economy has improved, and even 
in 2016, when the injection from Cohesion Fund programmes comes to a halt and the direct 
transfers are discontinued, GDP remains above baseline by more than 4 percent (Figure 1). 
Employment rises in the first years due to the demand expansion, but the employment effect 
is much smaller in following years as wages rise and productivity improvements put further 




The gap between the transfers received (COH) and the GDP effect in Figure 1 gives an 
indication of the degree of crowing-out in the short run. In the first years of the programme 
period, the GDP effect is less than the total injection into the economy. Only in the latter half 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that this assumes no increase in the participation rate. To the extent that labour market 
programmes and interventions on actions for women raise labour force participation, the simulations could 
underestimate the employment effects. In the tables the unemployment rate is reported.    15
of the programme period do the supply side improvements raise the level of GDP above the 
level of direct demand injection from the programmes. 
 
Most of the EU15 countries are net donor countries, but the net contributions differ, with 
Germany, Italy and Ireland receiving funds for their poorer regions. The donor countries face 
an increase in their tax burden to finance their higher EU contributions. The increase of 
almost half a percentage point on the tax rate on labour income has a negative impact on 
consumption and employment. The distortionary effect of wage taxes on employment is 
captured in the model by the degree to which the reservation wage (unemployment benefits) 
is affected by the tax increase, and the employment effect is typically stronger in continental 
European countries than in the Nordic and 'anglo-saxon' economies. The negative effect of the 
increase in the tax burden is partly offset by an improvement in the donor countries' exports as 
they benefit from higher demand for their products from the NMS. Countries with closer trade 
links with the NMS benefit relatively more from this. The net effect for the EU as a whole is 
negative in the first years, but turns positive as the output improvements in the beneficiary 



































Note: GDP % difference from baseline, COH is net-transfers received (as % of GDP)  
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 
 
GDP  0.43 0.56 0.80 0.97 1.22 1.42 1.72 2.48 3.07 2.68 
Consumption  1.83 1.78 1.80 1.84 1.89 1.93 2.02 2.24 2.50 2.24 
Investment  -1.29 -1.88 -2.12 -2.10 -1.94 -1.64 -1.09 -0.23 0.71  2.03 
Price  level  0.26 0.53 0.84 1.09 1.35 1.55 1.81 2.23 2.81 2.88 
Real eff. ex. rate 
(+ = depreciation) 
-0.82  -0.78  -0.55  -0.25 0.09 0.41 0.74 1.19 1.76 2.17 
Unemployment  rate  -0.12  -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.03  -0.08 
Net transfers rec.  
(% of GDP) 
0.28 0.65 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.72 0.66 0.83 0.78  0 
Trade balance  
(% of GDP) 




2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 
 
GDP  0.59 0.92 1.43 1.79 2.23 2.57 3.07 4.22 5.10 4.31 
Consumption  2.90 2.95 3.06 3.14 3.21 3.27 3.39 3.73 4.08 3.39 
Investment  -2.08 -2.65 -2.68 -2.39 -1.98 -1.40 -0.47 0.86  2.25  3.84 
Price  level  0.29 0.67 1.16 1.60 2.06 2.44 2.91 3.60 4.54 4.71 
Real eff. ex. rate 
(+ = depreciation) 
-1.11  -0.95  -0.57  -0.12 0.35 0.79 1.26 1.89 2.68 3.12 
Unemployment  rate -0.15 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.05 -0.11 -0.08 
Net transfers rec.  
(% of GDP) 
0.74 1.73 2.15 2.12 2.11 1.87 1.70 2.13 1.97  0 
Trade balance  
(% of GDP) 




2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 
 
GDP  -0.16 -0.20 -0.21 -0.23 -0.24 -0.26 -0.26 -0.21 -0.15 -0.19 
Consumption  -0.40 -0.46 -048 -0.48 -0.47 -0.45 -0.42 -0.40 -0.31 -0.10 
Investment  -0.13 -0.30 -0.43 -0.54 -0.65 -0.73 -0.78 -0.77 -0.71 -0.95 
Price  level  -0.06 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.04 0.07  0.23 
Real eff. ex. rate 
(+ = depreciation) 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.16 -0.19 -0.21 -0.18 
Unemployment  rate  0.04 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 -0.03 
Net transfers rec.  
(% of GDP) 
-0.07 -0.17 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.20 -0.18 -0.23 -0.22  0 
Trade balance  
(% of GDP) 




2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 
 
GDP  -0.11 -0.16 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 -0.24 -0.23 -0.16 -0.08 -0.09 
Consumption  -0.26 -0.33 -0.36 -0.36 -0.35 -0.33 -0.30 -0.27 -0.18 0.04 
Investment  -0.19 -0.44 -0.63 -0.77 -0.88 -0.96 -0.98 -0.92 -0.81 -0.82 
Price  level  -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 0.05  0.17 
Real eff. ex. rate 
(+ = depreciation) 
-0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.19 -0.18 -0.10 
Unemployment rate   0.02 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 -0.04 
Net transfers rec.  
(% of GDP) 
-0.05 -0.13 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 -0.17 -0.16  0 
Trade balance  
(% of GDP) 
0.06 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.13 
Note: Net beneficiaries: EL,ES,PT,CZ,EE,CY,LV,LT,HU,MT,PL,SI,SK,RO,BG. Net donors: BE,DE,FR,IE,IT, 
NL,AT,,FI,DK,SW,UK. Percentage differences from baseline.   17
Exchange rate regime 
 
Differences among the beneficiary countries are mainly a reflection of differences in fiscal 
injections. The larger the fiscal transfer received, the larger the initial demand stimulus and 
the larger the long run supply side effects. But the exchange rate regime also makes an 
important difference. Slovenia, as part of the euro area, and the three Baltic states, Cyprus and 
Malta, that peg their currencies against the euro, have relatively large GDP effects in the first 
year and less crowding out of the demand stimulus, as monetary policy is not responding to 
domestic inflationary pressures, and the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro is fixed. 
However, in following years, the GDP effects are smaller. With a fixed exchange rate, 
competitiveness can only be restored by relatively more modest wage growth in these 
countries. The effect of the exchange rate regime is best illustrated by comparing Poland 
(flexible exchange rate) and Lithuania (fixed exchange rate). Both receive roughly similar 
amounts in transfers, as percentage of their respective GDP. In the first year the GDP effect is 
much larger in Lithuania than in Poland, as monetary policy in Lithuania is set to remain its 
peg with the euro and cannot respond to reduce the inflationary pressures due to the demand 
impulse. In later years though Lithuania cannot devalue and has to go through a period of 
disinflation to regain competitiveness. Compared to Poland, its GDP gains are much smaller 




Figure 2: Difference in GDP effects between Poland (flexible exchange rate) and Lithuania 






























Note: GDP % difference from baseline, COH is net-transfers received (as % of GDP)    18
5.  Sensitivity analysis 
 
The simulation described above assumes the available funds are used effectively and 
efficiently to raise the productive potential of the economy. As such, they provide an 
indication of the potential effect of cohesion policy spending, but no judgement on the likely 
impact. It could be expected that not all transfers contribute to an increase in production 
capacities. The simulations are based on "optimistic" assumptions concerning the productive 
impact of all infrastructure investment, spending on human resources as well as support to 
business for R&D investment.  
 
In this section an alternative scenario is shown in which a lower productive impact of some 
of this spending is assumed. In the scenario described in the previous section, all 
infrastructure spending was assumed as productive as transport infrastructure and all human 
resources investment as productive as educational spending. The alternative scenario 
assumes a lower productive impact of spending on other categories than transport and 
education. More specifically the supply side assumptions in this variant are as follows: 
 
1.  Infrastructure investment: investment in transport infrastructure is assumed to have 
the same marginal product as that of private investment. All other infrastructure 
investment (environmental infrastructure, telecommunication infrastructure, urban 
rehabilitation, social infrastructure and health) is assumed to be only half as 
productive 
2.  Human capital: educational investment is assumed to have the productive impact as 
described in section 4.3 above, all other human capital investment (labour market 
programmes, social inclusion, entrepreneurship and actions for women) is assumed to 
have only half the productive impact. 
3.  Productive environment: investment support leads to a higher capital stock, but R&D 
investment has only half the impact on TFP as assumed in the first scenario.  
 
While one could imagine worse case scenarios, of e.g. zero productive impact of transfers 
(total inefficiency) or even a negative impact (transfers are detrimental to economic growth), 
this scenario is still optimistic as it assumes a significant positive impact of the transfers on 
the productive potential of the economy, but is arguable more realistic than the scenario 
described in the previous section. A comparison between these two scenarios gives an 
indication of the sensitivity of the outcomes to the assumed externalities and  illustrates the 
uncertainty surrounding the long run supply side impacts of structural funds. 
 
Figure 3 shows the GDP effects under the two variants (GDP and GDPL). Transport 
infrastructure investment forms a large share of total spending under the cohesion policy 
programmes and is in this alternative scenario still assumed to be as productive as private 
investment. The long run GDP effect is reduced by approximately one quarter under these 
less optimistic assumptions. For the NMS aggregate, the GDP is about 4 per cent higher in 
2015, and falls back to less than 3 percent when the transfers are discontinued, while the long 
run supply side effects was about 4.5 percent under the more optimistic assumptions. The 
dynamic adjustment is also affected, with smaller demand effects in the first years of the 
simulation due to lower productivity gains and permanent income gains anticipated by 
forward looking agents.  While this scenario still shows sizeable improvements in the 
beneficiary countries’ productive potential, it shows the sensitivity of the results to the 
underlying assumptions embedded in the model. 
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Note: GDP and GDPL (lower scenario)  % difference from baseline 
COH is net-transfers received (as % of GDP)  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The success or failure of the EU Cohesion Policy programme 2007-2013 in achieving real 
convergence in the EU can only be assessed ex post in the next decade. This note has given an 
ex-ante model-based analysis of the fiscal transfers, under the assumption that these transfers 
translate directly into productive investment. This gives an indication of the likely and 
potential effects of the policy on main economic variables. Although large parts of the 
spending are devoted to social infrastructure, the benefits of which one would not directly 
expect to be measurable in terms of higher GDP, most of the funds are used for supply side 
policies that aim to raise the productive capacity of the economies. A quantitative analysis of 
the macroeconomic impact of the cohesion policy programme is therefore imperative, also 
considering the importance of Cohesion Policy in the EU budget and the size of the fiscal 
transfers involved.  
 
Under favourable productivity assumptions, the long run supply side improvements are 
sizeable. On average GDP is raised by more than 5 percent at the end of the 2007-2013 
programming period in the new member states. Initially the transfers lead to higher inflation 
and a real appreciation of the exchange rate, and they are partially crowding out private 
spending. In the long run the productive potential of the economy improves and potential 
output is raised. These gains are permanent, and remain even after the transfers are 
discontinued. It is also shown how the exchange rate regime matters and the loss of the 
exchange rate in adjustment to this type of asymmetric shocks induces certain losses. 
 
The financing costs of the EU cohesion policy burden are here assumed to be borne by the old 
member states, and the increase in taxes to pay for higher EU contributions lead to a 
permanent output loss. This is the cost of redistribution among EU member states, which 
itself is based on political and equity considerations. The cost to donor countries is mitigated 
to some extent by higher export growth due to higher demand in the new member states. 
 
This model-based analysis gives an estimate only of the potential effect of Cohesion Policy 
programme and the long run output gains reflect the assumed productive impact of investment 
in infrastructure, human capital and R&D in the model. Lower assumptions on the productive 
impact would yield smaller economic benefits from the transfers. Although the simulations 
take into account crowding out of productive private investment due to intertemporal 
consumption-investment decisions, other absorption problems are not explicitly considered. 
As summarised in the introduction, there are several reasons why one could expect a less than 
optimal use of fiscal transfers, and such sub-optimal use will reduce the actual effectiveness 
of these fiscal transfers significantly. Given the importance of EU Cohesion Policy in the EU 
budget, it is of crucial importance that such absorption problems are as much as possible 
avoided. It is the identification of factors that give rise to such efficiency losses that should be 
the focus of evaluations of the EU cohesion policy.  
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Table A1: Planned payment profile programming period 2007-15 (mln €, programme prices) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL
Poland 2196 5541 7388 7811 8323 7851 7662 10341 10341 67454
.SF 1472 3715 4953 5236 5580 5264 5137 6932 6932
.CF 724 1826 2435 2574 2743 2588 2525 3408 3408
Czech 871 2198 2931 3099 3302 3115 3040 4102 4102 26759
.SF 583 1472 1962 2075 2211 2086 2035 2747 2747
.CF 288 726 968 1024 1091 1029 1004 1355 1355
Cyprus 21 53 70 74 79 75 73 98 98 642
. S F 1 4 3 5 4 75 05 35 04 9 6 6 6 6
.CF 7 18 23 25 26 25 24 33 33
Estonia 113 285 379 401 427 403 394 531 531 3465
.SF 75 190 253 267 285 269 262 354 354
.CF 38 95 126 134 142 134 131 177 177
Greece 666 1682 2242 2370 2526 2383 2325 3138 3138 20471
.SF 546 1377 1836 1941 2069 1951 1904 2570 2570
.CF 121 304 406 429 457 431 421 568 568
Spain 1149 2900 3867 4088 4356 4109 4010 5412 5412 35305
.SF 1034 2608 3478 3677 3918 3696 3607 4868 4868
.CF 116 292 389 411 438 413 403 545 545
Ireland 29 74 99 105 112 105 103 139 139 904
.SF 29 74 99 105 112 105 103 139 139
Italy 707 1783 2377 2513 2678 2526 2465 3327 3327 21704
.CF 707 1783 2377 2513 2678 2526 2465 3327 3327
Latvia 151 381 507 536 572 539 526 710 710 4633
.SF 101 254 338 358 381 360 351 474 474
.CF 50 127 169 179 190 180 175 237 237
Lithuania 225 567 756 799 852 803 784 1058 1058 6903
.SF 149 377 503 532 567 534 522 704 704
.CF 75 190 253 268 285 269 263 354 354
Hungary 826 2084 2779 2938 3131 2953 2882 3889 3889 25371
.SF 544 1372 1830 1935 2062 1945 1898 2561 2561
.CF 282 712 949 1003 1069 1008 984 1328 1328
Malta 28 70 94 99 106 100 97 131 131 858
. S F 1 9 4 7 6 36 67 16 76 5 8 8 8 8
.CF 9 23 31 33 35 33 32 44 44
Portugal 702 1771 2362 2497 2661 2510 2450 3306 3306 21564
.SF 602 1519 2026 2142 2282 2153 2101 2836 2836
.CF 100 252 336 355 379 357 348 470 470
Slovenia 137 346 462 488 520 491 479 646 646 4216
.SF 91 230 307 324 346 326 318 429 429
.CF 46 116 155 164 175 165 161 217 217
Slovakia 378 954 1272 1345 1433 1352 1320 1781 1781 11617
.SF 251 633 844 893 951 897 876 1182 1182
.CF 127 321 428 453 482 455 444 599 599
Eastern ge 563 1420 1893 2002 2133 2012 1963 2650 2650 17285
.SF 523 1320 1760 1861 1983 1871 1826 2464 2464
.CF 40 100 133 141 150 141 138 186 186
Bulgaria 224 564 752 796 848 800 780 1053 1053 6870
.SF 149 376 502 530 565 533 520 702 702
.CF 75 188 251 265 282 266 260 351 351
Romania 642 1620 2160 2283 2433 2295 2240 3023 3023 19717
.SF 428 1080 1440 1523 1622 1530 1493 2016 2016
.CF 214 540 719 761 811 765 746 1007 1007
TOTAL 9627 24294 32391 34245 36492 34422 33593 45336 45336 295736
Notes: Assumed payment profile based on 2000-2006 programme for 6 main countries, in 
"programming prices", mln euros.  23 
Table A2: Fields of interventions: assumptions for 2007-2013 programmes SF and CF 
 
Poland Czech RCyprus Estonia Greece Spain Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Hungary Malta Portugal Slovenia Slovakia Germany Bulgaria Romania
SF
Productive environment 12.9 24.0 34.5 25.2 12.3 18.7 17.7 33.2 32.1 27.8 23.3 10.7 22.2 41.3 8.4 31.3 20.1 20.1
Business support 10.7 15.0 23.0 10.5 7.2 10.1 8.8 20.0 26.6 11.0 12.8 2.3 12.8 19.0 3.0 19.6 12.8 12.8
Tourism 1.2 7.6 11.5 7.5 2.9 1.4 1.6 8.0 1.9 10.5 4.7 8.4 4.3 15.0 4.2 1.7 4.5 4.5
RTDI 1.0 1.4 0.0 7.2 2.2 7.2 7.3 5.2 3.6 6.3 5.8 0.0 5.1 7.3 1.2 10.0 2.7 2.7
HR 28.3 29.9 44.0 26.6 23.1 30.3 30.3 20.5 27.1 18.6 25.7 15.5 28.6 29.2 34.7 32.2 28.0 28.0
Labour market 7.4 6.8 10.8 6.9 4.7 13.1 1.4 6.0 10.7 4.5 7.3 1.1 2.6 11.0 16.2 12.7 7.2 7.2
social inclusion 2.5 5.3 5.2 2.3 4.2 2.6 7.1 1.1 2.3 1.7 5.0 3.7 4.4 4.1 2.1 6.6 4.3 4.3
education 11.3 12.0 24.2 11.4 7.6 3.6 16.8 7.9 9.7 6.0 8.9 6.3 15.1 10.3 14.3 3.5 10.7 10.7
entrepreneurship 6.1 4.8 0.0 5.6 4.3 9.7 4.6 3.9 3.9 6.0 4.0 1.4 6.1 3.4 1.2 5.7 5.0 5.0
actions for women 1.0 1.0 3.8 0.4 2.3 1.3 0.4 1.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 3.0 0.4 0.4 0.9 3.7 0.8 0.8
Infrastructure  52.5 41.7 15.8 43.7 59.7 50.2 49.8 39.3 34.9 47.9 45.5 68.0 46.5 23.6 44.0 36.3 46.6 46.6
Transport 30.9 18.8 3.3 13.4 33.4 25.4 38.4 16.7 18.2 18.4 16.1 21.8 18.7 3.7 25.1 18.7 21.9 21.9
Telecom 7.5 2.9 5.2 2.3 7.1 2.3 3.4 5.5 3.9 6.7 5.5 1.1 3.4 8.7 1.1 0.9 5.3 5.3
energy  1.5 1.6 2.9 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.4 3.9 7.8 0.9 0.4 0.0 3.7 0.5 0.1 1.3 1.3
environment 5.6 6.9 0.0 1.3 4.7 10.9 7.2 8.3 5.8 0.9 3.7 34.7 4.5 3.7 9.5 7.8 5.4 5.4
urban rehabilitation 3.9 8.4 1.9 5.2 7.2 6.2 0.0 6.0 0.0 1.6 6.3 4.9 9.8 3.8 1.8 5.7 6.2 6.2
social infra +health 3.1 3.1 5.4 18.6 6.3 4.8 0.0 1.4 3.1 12.5 13.0 5.1 10.1 0.0 6.0 3.1 6.4 6.4
Tech. assistance 6.3 4.4 5.7 4.5 4.9 0.8 2.2 7.0 5.9 5.7 5.5 5.8 2.7 5.9 12.9 0.2 5.4 5.4
CF
Infrastructure 
Transport 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
environmental 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
 
Notes: Assumed shares for 2007-2017 programmes based on 2000-2006 Structural Funds programmes. 
(1) Technical assistance SF: administrative expenditure, studies, etc. 
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Table A3  : GDP effects and net transfers received COH (% of GDP): 
           2007             2008              2009            2010            2011 
        COH     GDP      COH     GDP      COH     GDP      COH     GDP      COH     GDP   
 
DE     -0.06   -0.05    -0.15   -0.11    -0.20   -0.16    -0.20   -0.22    -0.20   -0.25 
FR     -0.08   -0.41    -0.20   -0.43    -0.26   -0.38    -0.26   -0.36    -0.26   -0.36 
IT     -0.04   -0.16    -0.11   -0.21    -0.13   -0.21    -0.13   -0.22    -0.13   -0.21 
UK     -0.08   -0.19    -0.20   -0.18    -0.24   -0.21    -0.24   -0.24    -0.24   -0.26 
ES      0.02   -0.05     0.04   -0.14     0.05   -0.19     0.04   -0.24     0.04   -0.25 
NL     -0.08   -0.12    -0.20   -0.15    -0.26   -0.15    -0.26   -0.15    -0.26   -0.15 
BE     -0.09   -0.16    -0.21   -0.20    -0.26   -0.20    -0.26   -0.19    -0.26   -0.19 
DK     -0.07    0.19    -0.16    0.05    -0.20   -0.07    -0.20   -0.16    -0.20   -0.20 
IE     -0.06   -0.03    -0.13   -0.09    -0.16   -0.07    -0.16   -0.06    -0.16   -0.06 
PT      0.33    1.30     0.79    1.05     0.99    0.74     0.98    0.58     0.99    0.63 
EL      0.22    1.08     0.50    0.85     0.62    0.57     0.61    0.38     0.61    0.36 
AT     -0.09    0.18    -0.21    0.08    -0.26    0.02    -0.26   -0.01    -0.26   -0.02 
SW     -0.08    0.11    -0.18   -0.10    -0.23   -0.15    -0.23   -0.18    -0.23   -0.21 
FI     -0.08   -0.26    -0.20   -0.30    -0.25   -0.28    -0.25   -0.26    -0.26   -0.26 
 
EE      0.76    1.14     1.66    0.92     2.06    0.84     2.04    0.98     2.04    1.34 
LV      0.80    3.06     1.65    1.59     2.00    0.68     1.92    0.44     1.89    0.61 
LT      0.83    1.30     1.84    1.17     2.30    1.07     2.28    1.18     2.28    1.53 
CY      0.14   -0.05     0.33    0.01     0.41    0.08     0.41    0.13     0.41    0.19 
MT      0.55    0.22     1.32    0.39     1.65    0.48     1.63    0.58     1.63    0.78 
CZ      0.71    0.61     1.67    0.76     2.08    1.25     2.05    1.59     2.04    1.99 
HU      0.87    0.37     2.03    1.03     2.50    1.76     2.44    2.30     2.41    2.90 
PL      0.77    0.39     1.80    0.96     2.24    1.64     2.23    2.02     2.23    2.44 
SI      0.43    0.43     1.01    0.46     1.26    0.49     1.25    0.56     1.26    0.75 
SK      0.78    0.81     1.78    1.18     2.18    2.02     2.12    2.72     2.08    3.54 
 
EA     -0.05   -0.10    -0.11   -0.16    -0.14   -0.18    -0.14   -0.21    -0.14   -0.21 
EU15   -0.05   -0.11    -0.13   -0.16    -0.16   -0.19    -0.16   -0.21    -0.16   -0.22 
NMS     0.74    0.59     1.73    0.92     2.15    1.43     2.12    1.79     2.11    2.23 
EU      0.00   -0.07     0.00   -0.09     0.00   -0.08     0.00   -0.08     0.00   -0.06 
 
           2012              2013             2014            2015                2020 
        COH     GDP      COH     GDP      COH     GDP      COH     GDP         COH     GDP   
  
DE     -0.18   -0.27    -0.16   -0.26    -0.21   -0.17    -0.19   -0.08       0.00   -0.05 
FR     -0.23   -0.37    -0.21   -0.37    -0.27   -0.34    -0.25   -0.27       0.00   -0.29 
IT     -0.12   -0.21    -0.11   -0.18    -0.14   -0.10    -0.13   -0.01       0.00   -0.06 
UK     -0.22   -0.29    -0.20   -0.30    -0.25   -0.32    -0.24   -0.32       0.00   -0.31 
ES      0.04   -0.27     0.04   -0.23     0.05   -0.06     0.04    0.12       0.00    0.20 
NL     -0.23   -0.15    -0.21   -0.15    -0.27   -0.10    -0.25   -0.04       0.00   -0.15 
BE     -0.23   -0.20    -0.21   -0.20    -0.27   -0.14    -0.25   -0.07       0.00   -0.16 
DK     -0.18   -0.22    -0.16   -0.23    -0.21   -0.20    -0.19   -0.16       0.00   -0.29 
IE     -0.14   -0.07    -0.13   -0.07    -0.17   -0.02    -0.16    0.04       0.00   -0.06 
PT      0.88    0.72     0.81    0.90     1.03    1.45     0.97    1.80       0.00    2.02 
EL      0.55    0.37     0.50    0.47     0.64    0.86     0.60    1.12       0.00    1.24 
AT     -0.24   -0.03    -0.22   -0.01    -0.27    0.06    -0.26    0.12       0.00   -0.17 
SW     -0.21   -0.24    -0.19   -0.26    -0.24   -0.24    -0.23   -0.19       0.00   -0.29 
FI     -0.23   -0.27    -0.21   -0.26    -0.27   -0.21    -0.25   -0.13       0.00   -0.23 
      
EE      1.82    1.69     1.68    2.11     2.13    2.91     2.01    3.47       0.00    3.57 
LV      1.69    0.79     1.56    1.08     1.99    1.86     1.87    2.27       0.00    2.13 
LT      2.04    1.85     1.88    2.30     2.38    3.22     2.24    3.80       0.00    4.32 
CY      0.36    0.24     0.33    0.31     0.42    0.51     0.40    0.66       0.00    0.60 
MT      1.46    0.94     1.34    1.15     1.71    1.61     1.61    1.86       0.00    1.87 
CZ      1.80    2.32     1.65    2.78     2.06    3.80     1.91    4.58       0.00    3.77 
HU      2.13    3.37     1.93    3.97     2.42    5.14     2.24    5.99       0.00    4.52 
PL      1.97    2.71     1.79    3.19     2.23    4.55     2.06    5.65       0.00    4.71 
SI      1.12    0.91     1.03    1.14     1.31    1.67     1.23    2.02       0.00    1.96 
SK      1.82    4.28     1.65    5.17     2.04    6.71     1.88    7.92       0.00    7.27 
      
EA     -0.12   -0.22    -0.11   -0.21    -0.14   -0.11    -0.13   -0.01       0.00   -0.03 
EU15   -0.14   -0.24    -0.13   -0.23    -0.17   -0.16    -0.16   -0.08       0.00   -0.09 
NMS     1.87    2.57     1.70    3.07     2.13    4.22     1.97    5.10       0.00    4.31 
EU      0.00   -0.05     0.00   -0.01     0.00    0.14     0.00    0.27       0.00    0.21   25
 




EE                      2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
GDP_PCER                 1.14    0.92    0.84    0.98    1.34    1.69    2.11    2.91    3.47    3.57 
PRIV.CONS_PCER           5.70    5.22    4.84    4.56    4.34    4.18    4.05    4.05    4.02    2.81 
PRIV.INV.I_PCER         -1.07   -2.02   -2.43   -2.35   -2.01   -1.55   -0.94   -0.08    0.83    2.61 
EXPORTS_PCER             0.09   -0.39   -0.40   -0.04    0.50    1.07    1.65    2.42    3.17    4.33 
IMPORTS_PCER             1.88    1.44    1.40    1.64    2.13    2.66    3.23    4.27    5.07    5.38 
EMPLOYMENT_PCER          0.25    0.06   -0.00   -0.03   -0.03   -0.05   -0.06   -0.04   -0.03   -0.04 
REAL.WAGE.COSTS_PCER     0.95    1.18    0.98    1.12    1.47    1.84    2.30    3.12    3.54    3.78 
PRICE.LEVEL_PCER         0.68    1.04    0.91    0.45   -0.11   -0.71   -1.24   -1.78   -2.25   -3.33 
CONS.PRICE.LEVEL_PCER    0.27    0.36    0.27    0.07   -0.14   -0.34   -0.53   -0.68   -0.77   -1.04 
DOLLAR.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -0.30   -0.38   -0.42   -0.44   -0.43   -0.43   -0.42   -0.33   -0.12    0.28 
EURO.EXCH.RATE_PCER      0.00    0.00    0.00 1.9e-11 3.7e-10 6.9e-12 9.6e-11 -6.2e-13   0.00 -8.9e-13 
REER_PCER               -0.77   -1.18   -1.08   -0.65   -0.11    0.48    1.01    1.60    2.21    3.56 
 
                     2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
SHORT.RATE_ER         -0.08   -0.05   -0.01    0.01    0.01    0.01    0.06    0.18    0.17    0.04 
INFLATION.PGDP_ER      0.69    0.36   -0.14   -0.46   -0.56   -0.60   -0.54   -0.54   -0.48    0.05 
INFLATION.PC_ER        0.27    0.10   -0.10   -0.20   -0.20   -0.21   -0.18   -0.16   -0.09    0.03 
UNEMPL.RATE_ER        -0.24   -0.06    0.00    0.03    0.03    0.05    0.06    0.04    0.03    0.04 
COH.GDP_ER             0.76    1.66    2.06    2.04    2.04    1.82    1.68    2.13    2.01    0.00 





LV                      2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
GDP_PCER                 3.06    1.59    0.68    0.44    0.61    0.79    1.08    1.86    2.27    2.13 
PRIV.CONS_PCER           8.72    7.07    6.09    5.67    5.43    5.28    5.17    5.19    5.22    4.63 
PRIV.INV.I_PCER         -1.24   -3.32   -4.64   -5.07   -5.02   -4.78   -4.37   -3.73   -2.89   -0.40 
EXPORTS_PCER            -0.96   -2.35   -2.68   -2.31   -1.70   -1.08   -0.48    0.15    0.67    1.65 
IMPORTS_PCER             3.20    1.55    0.77    0.60    0.74    0.94    1.20    1.88    2.37    2.57 
EMPLOYMENT_PCER          0.66   -0.01   -0.11   -0.12   -0.13   -0.16   -0.20   -0.22   -0.23   -0.20 
REAL.WAGE.COSTS_PCER     2.55    2.26    0.89    0.64    0.81    1.00    1.38    2.21    2.42    2.39 
PRICE.LEVEL_PCER         1.97    3.17    3.28    2.78    2.16    1.51    0.98    0.62    0.35   -0.66 
CONS.PRICE.LEVEL_PCER    1.33    2.09    2.14    1.77    1.34    0.89    0.52    0.28    0.11   -0.54 
DOLLAR.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -0.30   -0.38   -0.42   -0.44   -0.43   -0.43   -0.42   -0.33   -0.12    0.28 
EURO.EXCH.RATE_PCER   3.8e-11 -9.0e-11 3.2e-11 -1.8e-11 4.7e-10 2.1e-12 -6.9e-10 0.00    0.00    0.00 
REER_PCER               -2.01   -3.21   -3.36   -2.92   -2.33   -1.72   -1.22   -0.83   -0.45    0.79 
 
                     2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
SHORT.RATE_ER         -0.08   -0.05   -0.01    0.01    0.01    0.01    0.06    0.18    0.17    0.04 
INFLATION.PGDP_ER      2.05    1.24    0.11   -0.51   -0.62   -0.63   -0.52   -0.36   -0.27    0.06 
INFLATION.PC_ER        1.37    0.78    0.05   -0.37   -0.44   -0.44   -0.36   -0.24   -0.17    0.05 
UNEMPL.RATE_ER        -0.61    0.01    0.11    0.12    0.12    0.15    0.19    0.21    0.22    0.19 
COH.GDP_ER             0.80    1.65    2.00    1.92    1.89    1.69    1.56    1.99    1.87    0.00 






Note: PCER percentage difference from base, ER absolute difference from base  
(-.GDP_ER as % of GDP)   26
Lithuania 
 
LT                      2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
GDP_PCER                 1.30    1.17    1.07    1.18    1.53    1.85    2.30    3.22    3.80    4.32 
PRIV.CONS_PCER           3.16    2.95    2.91    3.02    3.14    3.24    3.37    3.61    3.84    3.84 
PRIV.INV.I_PCER         -1.15   -2.30   -2.94   -2.97   -2.67   -2.18   -1.46   -0.48    0.65    3.93 
EXPORTS_PCER             0.10   -0.59   -0.78   -0.52   -0.03    0.54    1.14    1.85    2.56    4.32 
IMPORTS_PCER             1.43    1.09    1.09    1.34    1.80    2.27    2.81    3.79    4.57    5.56 
EMPLOYMENT_PCER          0.24   -0.00   -0.07   -0.11   -0.13   -0.17   -0.20   -0.22   -0.22   -0.25 
REAL.WAGE.COSTS_PCER     1.16    1.47    1.22    1.36    1.71    2.06    2.59    3.52    3.92    4.57 
PRICE.LEVEL_PCER         0.74    1.33    1.35    0.96    0.44   -0.18   -0.73   -1.20   -1.66   -3.29 
CONS.PRICE.LEVEL_PCER    0.44    0.73    0.69    0.44    0.13   -0.22   -0.53   -0.78   -1.00   -1.81 
DOLLAR.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -0.30   -0.38   -0.42   -0.44   -0.43   -0.43   -0.42   -0.33   -0.12    0.28 
EURO.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -2.8e-10 -2.0e-10 5.6e-11 1.6e-11 3.3e-10 9.3e-13 -1.2e-10 0.00 1.8e-13 5.3e-13 
REER_PCER               -0.82   -1.45   -1.51   -1.16   -0.66   -0.06    0.48    0.98    1.57    3.49 
 
                     2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
SHORT.RATE_ER         -0.08   -0.05   -0.01    0.01    0.01    0.01    0.06    0.18    0.17    0.04 
INFLATION.PGDP_ER      0.74    0.59    0.02   -0.38   -0.52   -0.62   -0.55   -0.47   -0.47   -0.04 
INFLATION.PC_ER        0.44    0.29   -0.04   -0.25   -0.31   -0.35   -0.31   -0.25   -0.23   -0.01 
UNEMPL.RATE_ER        -0.23    0.00    0.07    0.10    0.13    0.16    0.20    0.21    0.22    0.24 
COH.GDP_ER             0.83    1.84    2.30    2.28    2.28    2.04    1.88    2.38    2.24    0.00 






CY                      2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
GDP_PCER                -0.05    0.01    0.08    0.13    0.19    0.24    0.31    0.51    0.66    0.60 
PRIV.CONS_PCER          -0.14   -0.11   -0.06   -0.01    0.04    0.09    0.14    0.25    0.34    0.37 
PRIV.INV.I_PCER         -0.41   -0.66   -0.79   -0.82   -0.79   -0.71   -0.56   -0.30    0.00    0.33 
EXPORTS_PCER            -0.04   -0.07   -0.03    0.04    0.12    0.20    0.28    0.43    0.60    0.76 
IMPORTS_PCER            -0.17   -0.09   -0.02    0.03    0.10    0.16    0.25    0.47    0.66    0.65 
EMPLOYMENT_PCER          0.01    0.01   -0.01   -0.02   -0.03   -0.03   -0.04   -0.05   -0.06   -0.05 
REAL.WAGE.COSTS_PCER    -0.01    0.05    0.13    0.18    0.25    0.30    0.40    0.62    0.73    0.68 
PRICE.LEVEL_PCER        -0.05   -0.12   -0.18   -0.23   -0.28   -0.34   -0.39   -0.40   -0.34   -0.27 
CONS.PRICE.LEVEL_PCER   -0.10   -0.16   -0.21   -0.25   -0.28   -0.32   -0.35   -0.33   -0.23   -0.10 
DOLLAR.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -0.30   -0.38   -0.42   -0.44   -0.43   -0.43   -0.42   -0.33   -0.12    0.28 
EURO.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -3.7e-10 -4.0e-10 -2.1e-11 1.6e-11 5.2e-10 9.2e-12 0.00 -3.4e-12 -8.9e-13 4.0e-13 
REER_PCER               -0.07   -0.07   -0.05   -0.01    0.04    0.09    0.13    0.19    0.25    0.42 
 
                     2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
SHORT.RATE_ER         -0.08   -0.05   -0.01    0.01    0.01    0.01    0.06    0.18    0.17    0.04 
INFLATION.PGDP_ER     -0.05   -0.06   -0.06   -0.06   -0.05   -0.06   -0.04   -0.01    0.06    0.03 
INFLATION.PC_ER       -0.10   -0.06   -0.05   -0.04   -0.03   -0.04   -0.03    0.02    0.10    0.04 
UNEMPL.RATE_ER        -0.01   -0.01    0.01    0.02    0.03    0.04    0.05    0.05    0.06    0.06 
COH.GDP_ER             0.14    0.33    0.41    0.41    0.41    0.36    0.33    0.42    0.40    0.00 
TRADE.BAL.TO.GDP_ER    0.07    0.01    0.00    0.01    0.01    0.02    0.02   -0.02   -0.04    0.06 
   27
Malta 
 
MT                      2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
GDP_PCER                 0.22    0.39    0.48    0.58    0.78    0.94    1.15    1.61    1.86    1.87 
PRIV.CONS_PCER           0.72    0.75    0.76    0.79    0.83    0.86    0.89    1.00    1.06    0.82 
PRIV.INV.I_PCER         -0.92   -1.80   -2.33   -2.46   -2.35   -2.07   -1.63   -1.04   -0.27    2.01 
EXPORTS_PCER            -0.23   -0.43   -0.43   -0.23    0.05    0.37    0.69    0.98    1.34    2.29 
IMPORTS_PCER             0.24    0.35    0.47    0.65    0.93    1.19    1.48    2.05    2.48    2.64 
EMPLOYMENT_PCER          0.05    0.02   -0.00   -0.02   -0.03   -0.04   -0.05   -0.03   -0.02   -0.02 
REAL.WAGE.COSTS_PCER     0.23    0.46    0.55    0.66    0.85    1.03    1.28    1.72    1.87    1.99 
PRICE.LEVEL_PCER         0.09    0.17    0.09   -0.14   -0.42   -0.73   -1.00   -1.18   -1.36   -1.93 
CONS.PRICE.LEVEL_PCER   -0.06   -0.06   -0.11   -0.22   -0.33   -0.46   -0.57   -0.62   -0.61   -0.73 
DOLLAR.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -0.30   -0.38   -0.42   -0.44   -0.43   -0.43   -0.42   -0.33   -0.12    0.28 
EURO.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -5.1e-10 -1.7e-10 6.7e-12 1.7e-11 4.7e-10 9.8e-12 2.3e-09 4.5e-11  0.00 -4.4e-14 
REER_PCER               -0.27   -0.41   -0.36   -0.14    0.14    0.45    0.73    0.98    1.30    2.15 
 
                     2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
SHORT.RATE_ER         -0.08   -0.05   -0.01    0.01    0.01    0.01    0.06    0.18    0.17    0.04 
INFLATION.PGDP_ER      0.09    0.08   -0.08   -0.24   -0.28   -0.31   -0.27   -0.18   -0.18    0.08 
INFLATION.PC_ER       -0.06   -0.00   -0.05   -0.11   -0.11   -0.13   -0.11   -0.04    0.01    0.05 
UNEMPL.RATE_ER        -0.05   -0.02    0.00    0.02    0.03    0.04    0.05    0.03    0.02    0.02 
COH.GDP_ER             0.55    1.32    1.65    1.63    1.63    1.46    1.34    1.71    1.61    0.00 






CZ                      2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
GDP_PCER                 0.61    0.76    1.25    1.59    1.99    2.32    2.78    3.80    4.58    3.77 
PRIV.CONS_PCER           5.27    5.19    5.19    5.16    5.15    5.12    5.15    5.38    5.55    4.01 
PRIV.INV.I_PCER         -1.64   -1.99   -1.83   -1.39   -0.85   -0.17    0.79    2.03    3.21    3.83 
EXPORTS_PCER            -0.58   -0.69   -0.21    0.23    0.70    1.12    1.64    2.51    3.40    3.56 
IMPORTS_PCER             0.90    1.40    1.91    2.28    2.75    3.16    3.76    4.96    5.96    4.95 
EMPLOYMENT_PCER          0.20    0.06    0.04    0.02    0.03    0.03    0.02    0.08    0.13    0.10 
REAL.WAGE.COSTS_PCER     0.50    0.94    1.34    1.69    2.06    2.40    2.90    3.87    4.42    3.84 
PRICE.LEVEL_PCER         0.32    0.58    1.01    1.46    1.94    2.41    2.98    3.72    4.71    5.42 
CONS.PRICE.LEVEL_PCER   -0.41   -0.06    0.53    1.15    1.83    2.50    3.30    4.34    5.71    6.72 
DOLLAR.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -1.30   -0.85   -0.08    0.73    1.61    2.47    3.50    4.88    6.72    8.23 
EURO.EXCH.RATE_PCER     -1.00   -0.47    0.35    1.17    2.05    2.91    3.93    5.22    6.85    7.93 
REER_PCER               -1.39   -1.19   -0.86   -0.51   -0.13    0.23    0.66    1.20    1.90    2.47 
 
                     2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
SHORT.RATE_ER          0.09    0.62    0.78    0.85    0.84    0.91    1.20    1.65    1.00    0.21 
INFLATION.PGDP_ER      0.32    0.26    0.43    0.44    0.48    0.46    0.55    0.73    0.95    0.11 
INFLATION.PC_ER       -0.41    0.36    0.59    0.62    0.67    0.66    0.78    1.01    1.32    0.15 
UNEMPL.RATE_ER        -0.19   -0.05   -0.04   -0.02   -0.03   -0.02   -0.02   -0.07   -0.12   -0.09 
COH.GDP_ER             0.71    1.67    2.08    2.05    2.04    1.80    1.65    2.06    1.91    0.00 




HU                      2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
GDP_PCER                 0.37    1.03    1.76    2.30    2.90    3.37    3.97    5.14    5.99    4.52 
PRIV.CONS_PCER           0.95    1.12    1.24    1.26    1.25    1.25    1.29    1.49    1.62    0.71 
PRIV.INV.I_PCER         -1.43   -2.01   -2.01   -1.76   -1.37   -0.85   -0.03    1.09    2.17    2.35 
EXPORTS_PCER             0.01    0.22    0.75    1.28    1.83    2.35    2.92    3.73    4.55    4.18 
IMPORTS_PCER             0.33    1.08    1.85    2.44    3.14    3.70    4.46    5.81    6.88    5.06 
EMPLOYMENT_PCER          0.08    0.04    0.01   -0.03   -0.05   -0.08   -0.09   -0.05   -0.01   -0.00 
REAL.WAGE.COSTS_PCER     0.43    1.18    1.91    2.53    3.12    3.61    4.28    5.45    6.08    4.76 
PRICE.LEVEL_PCER         0.15    0.54    1.11    1.69    2.32    2.90    3.56    4.33    5.25    5.03 
CONS.PRICE.LEVEL_PCER    0.02    0.59    1.45    2.37    3.37    4.27    5.28    6.45    7.83    7.39 
DOLLAR.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -0.33    0.36    1.39    2.47    3.63    4.70    5.94    7.39    9.13    8.89 
EURO.EXCH.RATE_PCER     -0.03    0.74    1.82    2.91    4.08    5.16    6.38    7.74    9.27    8.58 
REER_PCER               -0.28    0.03    0.49    0.97    1.47    1.94    2.46    3.04    3.70    3.50 
 
                     2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
SHORT.RATE_ER          0.43    0.88    1.03    1.12    1.06    1.08    1.30    1.60    0.74   -0.12 
INFLATION.PGDP_ER      0.15    0.39    0.57    0.58    0.62    0.56    0.64    0.74    0.88   -0.07 
INFLATION.PC_ER        0.02    0.59    0.87    0.92    0.98    0.87    0.98    1.11    1.29   -0.13 
UNEMPL.RATE_ER        -0.08   -0.04   -0.01    0.03    0.05    0.07    0.08    0.05    0.01    0.00 
COH.GDP_ER             0.87    2.03    2.50    2.44    2.41    2.13    1.93    2.42    2.24    0.00 






PL                     2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
GDP_PCER                 0.39    0.96    1.64    2.02    2.44    2.71    3.19    4.55    5.65    4.71 
PRIV.CONS_PCER           1.81    2.05    2.37    2.62    2.84    3.02    3.30    3.91    4.60    4.45 
PRIV.INV.I_PCER         -3.51   -3.78   -3.61   -3.21   -2.83   -2.29   -1.27    0.41    2.24    4.75 
EXPORTS_PCER            -0.70   -0.83   -0.28    0.26    0.80    1.25    1.72    2.53    3.58    3.70 
IMPORTS_PCER             0.11    1.08    1.70    2.05    2.48    2.79    3.37    4.91    6.28    5.45 
EMPLOYMENT_PCER          0.13    0.08    0.10    0.09    0.11    0.10    0.10    0.18    0.28    0.22 
REAL.WAGE.COSTS_PCER     0.39    1.01    1.62    2.06    2.43    2.73    3.26    4.48    5.26    4.69 
PRICE.LEVEL_PCER         0.17    0.53    1.11    1.70    2.29    2.77    3.32    4.22    5.49    5.81 
CONS.PRICE.LEVEL_PCER   -0.14    0.28    0.97    1.68    2.39    2.98    3.64    4.72    6.24    6.61 
DOLLAR.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -1.40   -0.77    0.28    1.35    2.43    3.32    4.33    5.99    8.36    9.16 
EURO.EXCH.RATE_PCER     -1.10   -0.39    0.71    1.79    2.88    3.77    4.77    6.34    8.49    8.85 
REER_PCER               -1.35   -1.07   -0.61   -0.14    0.33    0.71    1.13    1.79    2.72    2.99 
 
                     2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
SHORT.RATE_ER          0.28    0.85    1.02    1.09    0.90    0.87    1.33    2.06    1.02    0.14 
INFLATION.PGDP_ER      0.17    0.36    0.58    0.58    0.58    0.47    0.53    0.87    1.21    0.06 
INFLATION.PC_ER       -0.14    0.42    0.69    0.69    0.70    0.57    0.64    1.04    1.45    0.07 
UNEMPL.RATE_ER        -0.11   -0.07   -0.09   -0.08   -0.10   -0.09   -0.09   -0.16   -0.25   -0.19 
COH.GDP_ER             0.77    1.80    2.24    2.23    2.23    1.97    1.79    2.23    2.06    0.00 
TRADE.BAL.TO.GDP_ER   -0.31   -0.75   -0.79   -0.72   -0.69   -0.63   -0.68   -0.97   -1.10   -0.72 
   29
Slovenia 
 
SI                      2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
GDP_PCER                 0.43    0.46    0.49    0.56    0.75    0.91    1.14    1.67    2.02    1.96 
PRIV.CONS_PCER           1.50    1.47    1.45    1.48    1.55    1.62    1.72    1.93    2.15    2.04 
PRIV.INV.I_PCER         -0.77   -1.47   -1.86   -1.99   -1.95   -1.80   -1.51   -1.01   -0.46    0.74 
EXPORTS_PCER            -0.02   -0.18   -0.12    0.08    0.36    0.65    0.96    1.42    1.84    2.26 
IMPORTS_PCER             0.51    0.43    0.45    0.57    0.78    1.01    1.28    1.87    2.32    2.49 
EMPLOYMENT_PCER          0.10    0.07    0.05    0.04    0.05    0.05    0.06    0.11    0.14    0.13 
REAL.WAGE.COSTS_PCER     0.30    0.52    0.52    0.59    0.75    0.91    1.15    1.62    1.86    1.94 
PRICE.LEVEL_PCER         0.25    0.38    0.32    0.12   -0.11   -0.37   -0.60   -0.80   -0.95   -1.42 
CONS.PRICE.LEVEL_PCER    0.13    0.16    0.11   -0.01   -0.14   -0.28   -0.40   -0.50   -0.53   -0.70 
DOLLAR.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -0.30   -0.38   -0.42   -0.44   -0.43   -0.43   -0.42   -0.33   -0.12    0.28 
EURO.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -1.2e-10 -2.7e-10  0.00 -1.6e-11 4.8e-10 9.3e-12 -6.0e-10  0.00 6.4e-13 1.6e-13 
REER_PCER               -0.34   -0.53   -0.51   -0.34   -0.12    0.13    0.34    0.58    0.84    1.55 
 
                     2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
SHORT.RATE_ER         -0.08   -0.05   -0.01    0.01    0.01    0.01    0.06    0.18    0.17    0.04 
INFLATION.PGDP_ER      0.26    0.13   -0.06   -0.20   -0.23   -0.27   -0.22   -0.20   -0.15    0.04 
INFLATION.PC_ER        0.13    0.03   -0.06   -0.12   -0.13   -0.14   -0.12   -0.09   -0.04    0.03 
UNEMPL.RATE_ER        -0.10   -0.07   -0.05   -0.04   -0.05   -0.05   -0.06   -0.10   -0.14   -0.13 
COH.GDP_ER             0.43    1.01    1.26    1.25    1.26    1.12    1.03    1.31    1.23    0.00 







SK                      2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
GDP_PCER                 0.81    1.18    2.02    2.72    3.54    4.28    5.17    6.71    7.92    7.27 
PRIV.CONS_PCER           5.50    5.47    5.44    5.30    5.11    4.93    4.79    4.82    4.75    2.48 
PRIV.INV.I_PCER         -1.99   -2.46   -2.03   -1.11    0.04    1.42    3.16    5.20    7.13    8.72 
EXPORTS_PCER            -0.29   -0.14    0.67    1.48    2.36    3.22    4.18    5.54    6.87    7.34 
IMPORTS_PCER             1.31    2.01    2.96    3.86    4.95    5.96    7.18    9.08   10.65    9.75 
EMPLOYMENT_PCER          0.26    0.02   -0.04   -0.13   -0.17   -0.22   -0.25   -0.23   -0.20   -0.16 
REAL.WAGE.COSTS_PCER     0.75    1.47    2.23    3.00    3.81    4.56    5.54    7.11    8.03    7.52 
PRICE.LEVEL_PCER         0.41    0.97    1.82    2.75    3.77    4.77    5.89    7.19    8.66    9.80 
CONS.PRICE.LEVEL_PCER   -0.18    0.58    1.82    3.25    4.85    6.42    8.15   10.15   12.38   14.13 
DOLLAR.EXCH.RATE_PCER   -1.08   -0.09    1.45    3.16    5.05    6.93    9.03   11.51   14.35   16.78 
EURO.EXCH.RATE_PCER     -0.78    0.29    1.88    3.61    5.51    7.39    9.49   11.87   14.49   16.45 
REER_PCER               -1.26   -0.82   -0.14    0.61    1.43    2.23    3.11    4.11    5.20    6.13 
 
                     2007A   2008A   2009A   2010A   2011A   2012A   2013A   2014A   2015A   2020A  
 
SHORT.RATE_ER          0.48    1.32    1.61    1.79    1.78    1.84    2.15    2.54    1.48    0.23 
INFLATION.PGDP_ER      0.42    0.56    0.85    0.92    1.00    0.97    1.07    1.23    1.38    0.13 
INFLATION.PC_ER       -0.18    0.76    1.25    1.41    1.56    1.49    1.62    1.84    2.03    0.18 
UNEMPL.RATE_ER        -0.22   -0.02    0.04    0.11    0.15    0.19    0.22    0.20    0.18    0.14 
COH.GDP_ER             0.78    1.78    2.18    2.12    2.08    1.82    1.65    2.04    1.88    0.00 







Note: PCER percentage difference from base, ER absolute difference from base  
(-.GDP_ER as % of GDP) 